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ABSTRACT 
Grades are important for admission of students in most higher education programmes. Analysing admission and 
student performance data at a major Norwegian business school, we find that the grading practice of teachers at 
regional colleges sending students to the school is affected by the average performance of the students being 
graded. Teachers at colleges recruiting good students from upper secondary school tend to be strict in their 
grading practice, while teachers at colleges recruiting less good students tend to follow a lenient practice. This 
has implications for the interpretation of grades and hence for optimal admission procedures. We develop a 
methodology to assess the consequences of differential grading standards. Approximately ten percent of the 
students in our data are admitted at the expense of more competent students. We demonstrate costs for the school 
admitting wrong students and in particular for the rejected students. 
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Introduction 
Grades are important for comparing students, and in particular when ranking students for 
admission to higher education. We investigate whether the grading practice of teachers is 
affected by the average quality of the students being graded. Such an effect will have 
implications for the interpretation of grades awarded by different colleges and for admission 
to advanced study programmes.  
 
In Norway, as in many other countries, applications to undergraduate studies are decided by a 
centralised application processing centre.1 Admission is based on the students’ grade point 
average (GPA) adjusted for the number and composition of credits, work experience and age.2 
No discretionary judgement of the students’ academic potential is done. This system is 
administratively highly efficient, and fair in the sense that it is strictly governed by rules that 
apply in the same manner for all students regardless of their background and connections. In 
order for this system to allocate applicants correctly to study programmes, however, it is a 
prerequisite that all institutions practice the same grading standard. It has been asserted that 
this is not the case, and our study aims to illuminate this issue.3  
 
If the current admission system is fair and efficient, students with equal GPA or admission 
points should be equally competent to succeed in the field of study they compete for 
admission to, regardless of which institution they apply from. Within the field of economics 
and administration, there are a large number of undergraduate programmes with a similar 
curriculum. The “Siviløkonom” course at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration (NHH) is a very popular place for students to continue from all of these 
programmes. This makes NHH a suitable “laboratory” to investigate the existence of differing 
grading practices and their causes and consequences. Our research strategy is to analyse how 
student performance at NHH varies with previous grades and the characteristics of the 
colleges where the grades were obtained. 
                                                 
1 The Norwegian Universities and Colleges Admission Service, see 
http://www.samordnaopptak.no/info/english/. Although centralised application processing centres are found in 
many countries, there is large heterogeneity in the extent of institutional autonomy concerning admission 
procedures. In Norway, only a few private colleges govern their own admission at the bachelor level. 
2 The GPA adjusted for credits achieved in upper secondary school is sometimes referred to as “school points”, 
3 Pål Veiden opened this debate with a feature article in the Norwegian magazine Morgenbladet on July 9th 2004. 
He warned of “local grade cultures” and predicted a development where “college and university grades would 
become better the further from Oslo one finds oneself and the poorer the performance of the college or 
university”. Similar concerns have been raised e.g. in Sweden by Collin and Smith (2007) and in Italy by 
Bagues, Labini and Zinovyeva (2007) and De Paola (2009). 
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The NHH Siviløkonom course analysed was a four year program divided into 3 study blocks.4 
The first and second blocks lasted 3 semesters each, while the third block lasted 2 semesters. 
From 1994 until 2002, students from regional colleges competed for direct admission to the 
second block of the Siviløkonom course. The qualifying college programmes lasted two years 
and were subject to a common framework with a high degree of overlap with mandatory 
subjects in the first block of the Siviløkonom course. The colleges further operated with a 
common grading scale (1-6) and admission to NHH was based on a point system that 
provided for equal treatment of all colleges. 
 
If similar performances are rewarded similarly across all colleges, a given sum of admission 
points should represent the same potential for success at NHH. In a regression model used to 
predict student achievement based on admission points, the college an applicant comes from 
should reveal no information concerning expected success. Finding that for a given sum of 
admission points, students from certain colleges perform systematically better or poorer than 
others would indicate that different colleges grade equally good students differently. This is 
investigated in the first part of our analysis. We find that college background reveals 
information concerning academic success at NHH, even if we control for admission points. 
More specifically, we find that the grading practice of teachers is affected by the average 
quality of the students being graded. Teachers at regional colleges recruiting good students 
from upper secondary school tend to be strict in their grading practice, while teachers at 
colleges recruiting less good students tend to follow a lenient practice. We also find some 
support for the view that study programmes with many students are stricter than small 
programmes. 
 
In the second part of the analysis, we quantify the consequences of different colleges using 
the grading scale differently. We find that approximately ten percent of students admitted 
directly to the second block of studies at NHH were admitted at the expense of more 
competent students from strict colleges. The difference between the most and the least strict 
                                                 
4 The Siviløkonom course described here was phased out in 2006 and replaced by a five year bachelor + master 
program in compliance with the EU Bologna process. Students who complete a bachelor degree in business 
administration at a regional college may apply directly to the master program at NHH, and admission to the 
master program is based on their bachelor grade point average. Hence, the problem we analyze is as relevant 
after the reform as before. This grade comparison problem also applies outside the field of business 
administration. There are e.g. master programs in engineering where bachelor students from numerous colleges 
compete for admission, and there is large variation in entrance requirements at these colleges in terms of 
admission points from upper secondary school. 
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colleges is so great that it can take students several semesters to acquire corresponding 
additional admission points, and those students, which our model classifies as “error 
admissions”, have experienced a higher failure rate and general weaker performance than a 
control group of marginally qualified, “correct admission” students. 
 
What could cause heterogeneity in grading standards? 
There is a substantial literature on grading standards summarized e.g. in Johnson (2003) and 
Hu (2005). One large strand of the literature deals with grade inflation. This literature focuses 
on how incentives to award good grades lead to more lenient grading standards in higher 
education – particularly in the US. Commonly investigated incentives relates to student 
evaluations, competition for students and allocation of public money. An intertwined strand of 
the literature deals with grade divergence, i.e. how grading standards evolve differently across 
different institutions, departments and fields. Grade divergence is part of a larger literature on 
differential grading standards.  One mechanism for differential grading standards not related 
to incentives was investigated by Goldman, Schmidt, Hewitt and Fischer (1974). Building on 
Helson’s (1947; 1948) theory of adaption level, they found evidence suggesting that teachers 
anchor their judgement of a specific student’s performance by comparing that student’s 
performance to the performance of the other students in the class. This causes the stringency 
of grading standards to be positively related to average student ability. They point out that this 
has implications for college admission. 
 
In Norway, teachers at all levels are supposed to grade students according to a “national 
norm”. The role of a national assessment norm is to ensure compatibility of grading standards 
across institutions, both at the upper secondary school level and in higher education. 
However, the national norm is not well defined, and it is challenging for teachers to have a 
strong opinion as to “where the bar is” for a given grade in a given subject at a given level. In 
this situation it seems plausible that the answers in a batch of examination papers – to some 
extent – will be assessed comparatively, rather than relative to the national norm. Hægeland, 
Raaum and Salvanes (2005) find that such an effect manifests itself in Norwegian lower 
secondary school where they compare final assessment and grades on national exams for 
students completing 10th grade in 2002 and 2003. Such comparative assessment creates 
problems if the quality of the students varies systematically from college to college. If an 
average student attends a college with low admission requirements and therefore has many 
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weak fellow students, it is easier for this student to distinguish him or herself positively than 
for a similar student who is the last to be admitted at a college with high admission 
requirements. Should this line of thought prove correct, the different use of the grading scale 
may be related to how easy or difficult it is to be admitted to different colleges. 
 
If examination papers in a batch are assessed relative to each other, this may also cause 
students at colleges with weak professors to be assessed too leniently. Poor course quality will 
not be fully reflected in poor grades. Good professors normally prefer central institutions with 
a large faculty, and it is therefore possible that differing grading practices will be indirectly 
related to the size of the study programmes. A mechanism that points in the same direction is 
that small classes promote strong bonds between students and teachers. This may create a 
psychological barrier against strict grading. 
 
Data 
The data used encompasses admissions information from 1998 to 2002 and examination 
information from 1998 to 2003, derived from the student database system “FS” at NHH. 
 
The grade data includes all subjects within the Siviløkonom course for the second and third 
study blocks from spring 1998 to spring 2003. This encompasses more than 38 000 
examination papers handed in by 2313 individuals. Hence we have an unbalanced panel with 
16.5 grade observations per individual students. The data base includes 529 “college students” 
admitted to the second study block of the course with point of departure in a two-year college 
programme, and 1748 “four-year students”, i.e. students admitted directly from upper 
secondary school to the first study block of the course. See table 1 for further information. 
The most central part of our analysis is based on the sample of “college students”. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Admission data includes both admitted and rejected applicants for the second block of study 
to the Siviløkonom course for the period 1998-2002. We have complete information on 
individual admission points, college background and year of application. Admission points 
represent the students’ averages grades from college adjusted for any additional points. We 
cannot distinguish between “grade points” and “additional points”. However, it takes time to 
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earn additional points, and we know the age of the applicants. This is used to proxy for 
additional points. Furthermore, we have information on the number of student places for the 
economic and administrative programmes of the different colleges, as well as the admission 
point requirements. Descriptive statistics on the different regional colleges included in this 
study are provided in table 2. We have chosen not to disclose the identity of the colleges used 
in the analysis, hence they are labelled college A-W. To assure that publicly available 
information given in table 2 cannot be used to identify whether a particular college follows a 
strict or lenient grading practice, we have used another set of labels in tables with regression 
results. Colleges are in these tables labelled “college 1-23” and the order is different from the 
order in table 2. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
The relationship between college background and academic 
success at NHH 
The relationship between college background and academic success at NHH is investigated 
with the aid of regression analysis.5 We estimate four different models, reported in table 3. 
The dependent variable is examination grade at NHH. The grading scale is from 0 to 9, with 9 
as the highest grade, 5 as the laudability limit and 2 as the lowest pass mark.6 Since the grade 
database is a panel with repeated observations of each student, we allow an unobserved 
individual-specific effect in the regressions. This individual specific effect will capture each 
student’s ability or potential to do well at NHH beyond what can be inferred through college 
background and admission points. This is modelled as a normally distributed random effect. 
The estimation method is Generalised Least Squares (GLS)7. Using the Lagrangian Multiplier 
                                                 
5 See Betts (1997) and Betts and Grogger (2003) for similar analyses of American junior and senior high schools. 
They find significant differences in grading practice between different schools, and demonstrate that strict grade-
setting increases student learning. Figlio and Lucas (2004) find corresponding results in an analysis of variations 
in grading practices between American elementary school teachers. In a recent paper using data from Italian 
Universities, De Paola (2009) find that “students obtain lower grades in courses attended by students with higher 
ability”. In line with our hypothesis, she suggests that this is because “instructors evaluate their students on a 
relative basis and adjust their grading standards to the average level of ability encountered in the classroom”. 
6 A new grading scale with grades from A-F was implemented in the autumn of 2003. Our data set extends to, 
and includes, the spring of 2003. 
7 Generalised Least Squares is a flexible generalization of ordinary least squares. If there is an unobserved 
individual specific effect in the grade data, the grades a student obtains will be correlated even when we 
condition on the observed student characteristics. A new observation of a student already in the data set, 
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test for random effects developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Baltagi and Li (1990), we 
can clearly reject the null hypothesis of no individual specific effect in the error terms. This, 
of course, does not assure that our normality assumption is correct, but the estimated 
coefficients are robust to using ordinary least squares (OLS) in steady of GLS. The OLS 
estimates do not rely on normally distributed error terms.8 
 
We start by investigating whether the college students on average perform poorer or better 
than the four-year students do. From table 3, first column, it may be seen that there is a 
statistically significant, but very small (-0.13) difference in average grades between college 
students and four-year students. This small difference indicates that the admission limit for 
admission of college students to the second block course of study is practically correctly set. 
One would like the last to be admitted college student to be as able as the last to be admitted 
four-year student. We do not have sufficient information to check marginal students against 
each other and must therefore rely on average differences between the two groups. 
 
In column 2, we investigate whether this very small average difference conceals essential 
differences between students from different colleges. The dummy variable for college 
students is therefore, replaced with separate dummy variables for each of the 23 colleges. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We see that in part, there are significant differences in achievement between students from 
different colleges. This may indicate different grading practices in the different colleges, but 
note from table 2 that several of the colleges are represented by very few students. Moreover, 
since we have not controlled for the students’ admission points, the coincidental composition 
of the student groups from different colleges may affect the results. 
 
If all colleges use the grading scale alike, a given sum of admission points should represent 
the same potential for success at NHH. Testing this is a main objective in our analysis. In 
column 3, therefore, we include the admission points of each student on admission to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
therefore, does not contain as much information as a new observation of a student not already in the data set. 
Assuming random effects, GLS will minimize a weighted sum of squared residuals so that this information about 
the group structure of the data set is used optimally. The weakness of the approach is that the results may be 
sensitive to the particular assumptions made about the structure of the residuals. 
8 Strictly speaking, the error terms cannot be normally distributed, as our dependent variable is categorical. 
Grade data, however, are usually well approximated with the normal distribution.  
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second block course of study at NHH. If all colleges use the grading scale alike, the college an 
applicant comes from should now not reveal any information concerning expected success.  
 
Since the four-year students are admitted to NHH directly from upper secondary school and 
do not have comparable admission points to the second block course, these are excluded from 
the rest of our analysis. We choose as a new reference group the students with background 
from college no. 1. This is of course an arbitrary choice, but it seems a natural choice as the 
students from colleges no. 1 are similar to the original NHH reference group, cf. the 
coefficient on college no. 1 in column 2. Moreover, the group is fairly large so the measured 
level is not likely to be driven by random variation.  
 
Admission points to the second block course of study at NHH consist of average grade from 
the two year college programmes and up to 0.4 additional points for work experience, military 
service and/or other higher education qualifications over and above admission requirements. 
In column 3, we also control for age. The age variable runs from 0 to 7, where 0 21 years, 
1=22 years, ... , 6=27 years and 7 28 years. The variable measures the number of years the 
students have had to acquire additional points. 
 
From column 3 we see that when the average grade (admission points) from a previous place 
of study increases by 1, the anticipated grade at NHH increases by 1.86 ±0.14, all else equal.9 
Note that each grade level on a scale of 1 to 6 corresponds to a 1.67 grade stage on the NHH 
scale of 0 to 9, and if we only use pass grades, each grade level from 1 to 4, corresponds to 
two grade stages on a scale from 2-9. Hence, there seems to be a close, one to one, 
correspondence between grade levels from the previous places of study and the grade levels at 
NHH. We test the specification for possible non-linearities in admission points and age but 
find no significant second order coefficient. 
 
As mentioned, the age variable is intended as a proxy for students’ additional points on 
admission. If the additional point awarding activities represent relevant competence building 
in relation to studies at NHH, the age variable should not have significant impact. The grade 
average would then be correctly adjusted for greater competence achieved via point awarding 
activities. The coefficient is however, significantly negative and indicates that the additional 
                                                 
9 The sign on the coefficient in the table is negative because admission points follow the (old) college grading 
scale where 1 is the best and 6 the weakest. As a result, good students have a low number of admission points. 
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points system has been too generous from an academic point of view. All else equal, an 
increase of 1 year in age at commencement of studies, causes the expected grade at NHH to 
fall by 0.15 ±0.01. Hansen (2005) makes a similar finding in an analysis of Norwegian 
medical students. 
 
The most interesting variables in column 3 are the dummy variables identifying the college 
from which the individual applicant had his or her background. Having controlled for 
admission points and age, we should see no significant coefficients on these variables if all 
colleges assess similar performances equally. However, for given admission points and age, 
there are significant differences in student performance between students with background 
from different colleges. An F-test clearly rejects a hypothesis that all the college dummies are 
simultaneously zero. The difference between the best and the poorest student groups is almost 
a whole grade. Students from college no.18 have on average, a 0.58 poorer grade than 
students from college no. 1 (the reference group), while students from college no. 13 have, on 
average, a 0.32 better grade. This suggests that colleges use the grade scale differently. 
 
The regression reported in column 3 has the highest level of explanation in the table, but R2 is 
nevertheless, only 19 %. This indicates a wide grade variation around the predicted level, and 
is to be expected. The model does not account for random variation in student preparation, 
student performance, difficulty of the exam and random errors in the censoring process. In 
addition, the students’ admission points do not perfectly measure their academic potential, cf. 
our discussion of the error term on page 6. 
  
We have hypothesised that colleges with a lenient grading practice will be characterised by 
low admission requirements and few student places. This is tested in column 4 where the 
dummy variables for which college a student applies from are replaced by the colleges’ 
characteristics. We have included admission requirements for non-open colleges, a dummy 
for whether a student is from an open course of study, i.e. a programme where all students 
with a diploma from upper secondary school are accepted, and the number of student places. 
All characteristics are measured two years prior to admission to NHH such that they agree 
with the intake of the individual student in our sample.10 
 
                                                 
10 Gain of additional points and delay in earlier studies create a degree of imprecision in the timing, but this is 
hardly a problem given that the college characteristics are relatively stable over time. 
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We see that, all else equal, the expected grade at NHH increases by 0.29 ± 0.09 when the 
admission requirement to the college the student attended increases by 1 grade. Admission 
requirement is measured by school points which are the average grade from upper secondary 
school. The number of student places is also influential. The expected grade at NHH increases 
by 0.11 ± 0.03 per hundred students of the programme from which they come, all else equal. 
One possible interpretation is that small schools with close contact between teachers and 
students reward students’ performances more generously than large schools with greater 
distance between teachers and students. 
 
It is perhaps counter-intuitive that the dummy variable for open studies is positive. 
Apparently, the expected grade at NHH is 1.22 higher for students with background from 
open studies. However, for these students, the school points variable with coefficient 0.29 is 
missing and set to zero. Hence, these two variables need to be evaluated together. The 
interpretation of the two coefficients is that open studies impose a student quality 
corresponding to an admission limit of 1.220/0.0293 = 41.64 school points. This is not 
extremely low, so open studies do not necessarily imply that the students are weak. Both the 
numerator and denominator come with a rather wide confidence interval, however, so the 
point estimate is rather uncertain.  
 
Alternative interpretations 
Our results are consistent with different colleges using the grade scale differently. It is, 
however, important to consider whether our results are consistent with other explanations as 
well. Various mechanisms have been suggested to us, all built on the belief that some colleges 
manage to lift students to a higher level of competence than other colleges on the grounds of 
good teaching quality. There is certainly reason to believe that there is variation between 
study programs with respect to teaching quality, but this in itself cannot account for our 
results. The relevant question is whether some colleges give their students some sort of 
quality that is not reflected in the students’ grades, even if all schools use the same grading 
standard. This quality element must help the students do well at NHH. It can be good working 
habits, motivation, extracurricular knowledge or the development of critical thought. Such 
qualities seems closely related to the distinction between a deep-level and a surface-level 
approach to learning, first made by Marton and Säljö (1976a). A deep-level approach to 
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learning will lead to long term recall and make students more able to apply their knowledge 
outside the exam situation.  
 
In theory, another possible mechanism is that some schools systematically fail to bring out the 
potential in their students so that when they start at NHH they tend to do better than expected, 
given their previous grades. From an econometric point of view, both mechanisms imply that 
the individual specific component in the error term is correlated with the college dummies and 
the school characteristics. Whatever the mechanism, table 3, column 4, shows that students 
doing better than expected tend to come from colleges with high admission limits and many 
student places. 
 
Given the data available, we cannot rule out that the alternative mechanisms described above 
are relevant. We do not find it plausible, however, that differences in teaching quality are 
driving our results. One reason is that we see no a priori theoretical underpinning for why 
students doing better than expected should come from colleges with high admission limits and 
many student places. Another reason is that we find evidence consistent with different grading 
standards also within NHH. In Møen and Tjelta (2005, section 9) we present an analysis of 
90 000 examination results from 1995 to 2003 for students in the Siviløkonom course. We 
group the examination codes for six electives, five fields of specialisation as well as “various 
subsidiary courses” and the “Siviløkonom thesis”. In a corresponding manner to the analysis 
of differences in examination results between students from different colleges, we use average 
grades from mandatory courses in the second study block as an indicator of the student’s 
ability. Thereafter we analyse how well students perform in the elective topics and in the 
specialised fields of the final study year. Our analysis reveals that subject fields that recruit 
strong students tend to award lower grades and the opposite. There is no reason to think that 
teaching quality vary systematically within NHH in a manner that can explain this pattern. 
 
Consequences of differential grading standards 
Table 3, columns 3 and 4 show that there is a systematic difference between students admitted 
with the same sum of points, but with background from different colleges. Our interpretation 
is that this principally reflects different grading standards. One may then argue that students 
from colleges practicing particularly strict grading should have extra compensatory points and 
students from colleges practicing particularly lenient grading should have corresponding 
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penalty points. It is hardly possible to construct a perfect admission system, and some degree 
of unfairness should therefore be accepted without spending resources on developing new 
routines. Before suggesting a policy change, therefore, it is important to quantify the extent of 
the problem. One way to measure the extent of the problem is to assess the number of 
students who would be affected by introducing an “ideal” admission system. Since we have 
admittance information for both admitted and rejected applicants, such an ideal admission can 
be simulated based on our regression results. 
 
The rest of this chapter, and the associated tables 4, 5 and 6, are not included in this 
summary version of the paper. See information on the front page. Our main findings are 
as follows: 
 
The simulation results indicate that a scant 10 % of the students are “error admissions”. For 
approximately half of the colleges, the grades are so divergent that students would need to 
spend one to two semesters to earn the corresponding additional points.  
The proposed error admission students have lower GPA, higher failure rate, more 
examination attempts and less progress than the students’ in the control group. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In our main analysis, we have examined the academic performance of 529 individuals from 
23 regional colleges admitted midway to the Siviløkonom course at a major Norwegian 
business school, NHH. Information on which college a student has as background helps us 
predict the student’s academic performance at NHH even when we control for the student’s 
admission points. Most likely this reflects that similar performances are rewarded differently 
at different colleges. The difference between the most and the least strict colleges is so large 
that it can take students several semesters to gain corresponding additional points. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that as many as ten percent of the students admitted to the 
second study block at NHH from 1998 to 2002, may have been admitted at the expense of 
more competent students from stricter colleges. The students that our model classifies as 
“error admissions” experience a higher failure rate and a generally weaker performance than a 
control group of marginal “correct admission” applicants. 
 
In this study we look at a sample of the best undergraduates only; those applying for 
admission to a leading Norwegian business school. Strictly speaking, we can therefore only 
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draw conclusions on how the college characteristics influence grading at the top end of the 
grade distributions. In Møen and Tjelta (2005, section 9), however, we analyse grade setting 
in the different subject areas at NHH and look at performance across the complete grade 
distribution. There we find corresponding tendencies. 11 The colleges that graded the 
applicants in our main sample teach a broad set of subjects, mostly in a classroom setting. We 
therefore believe that the grading problem we point to is representative for most grading 
situations. 
 
Misallocation of talent can have important consequences. We know, for example that 
different types of education give very different private returns measured in salary. From the 
point of view of society, it is also important to allocate human capital in the most effective 
way possible. 
 
How can the situation be improved? The differences in college grading standards appear to be 
systematically related to the quality of the student body and the size of the programme. 
Undergraduate programmes that recruit weak students award better grades for given 
performances. The same applies to some programmes with few student places. One solution is 
to move away from a centralised admission system and rather allow all institutions to assess 
applicants according to their own judgements. This is practiced for example, in Britain and 
the USA. This will probably bring about a widespread use of international, standardised tests 
and inflict significant costs on both the applicants and the institutions. A more obvious 
remedy is to implement measures that help censors form a realistic picture of what represents 
the national norm for different grades at each level and subject field.12 One instrument is the 
use of external censors. However, all grades used in this analysis were awarded in 
collaboration with external censors. Hence external censorship is not sufficient. What may be 
the problem is that individual teachers and colleges choose their own external censors. In this 
way, a pattern of cooperation may develop whereby colleges with lenient grading standards 
                                                 
11 In an analysis that is not reported, we also find that the failure limit is influenced by the quality of the students 
who take an examination or choose a particular subject field. Unfairness regarding who fails and who passes a 
course of study can therefore present an equally serious side of the problem as unfairness regarding admission to 
further studies. 
12 The Norwegian Association of Higher Education Colleges (UHR) is working on this at a general level. In 
order to harmonise the understanding of what the different grades involve, general “requirement specifications” 
have been drawn up. Within economic-administrative studies, the national council for economic and 
administrative fields (NRØA) has developed a subject-specific grading description. UHR’s national faculty 
meetings have in addition appointed a reference panel that is to keep records of grade statistics and monitor its 
subject fields. However, none of these measures represents direct or continuous feedback to the individual censor 
and the grade setting of those concerned. 
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choose censors from other colleges with equally lenient grading standards and 
correspondingly so in strict colleges. A better remedy, which at the same time will produce 
interesting data for the authorities, is exams that are co-ordinated across schools nationwide. 
This is feasible in subject fields where many colleges offer similar programmes. One can 
hardly expect that all censors will have the same interpretation of the grading scale without 
some mechanism that provides systematic feedback to censors as to “where the bar is”. In a 
companion analysis, we find that even within a large institution like NHH, it is difficult to 
achieve consistent grading standards across different study areas. Presently there is a lacking 
awareness of this problem.13 
 
As a final remark, we would like to return to the alternative interpretation of our results 
discussed after table 3. We cannot entirely rule out that differences in teaching quality affect 
our findings as well as different grading standards. One particular possibility is that some 
study programs promote deep-level learning while others promote surface-level learning. 
Marton and Säljö (1976b) suggest that whether students choose one learning strategy or the 
other depends on how the assessment systems are designed. Co-ordination of exams across 
schools may be a tool to promote exam questions that reward deep learning. This way, 
improved average exam quality and learning may be a side benefit associated with the 
solution we propose.  
                                                 
13 This is evident from the comments made by university and college rectors and administrators in the debate 
referred to in footnote 3. 
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Table 1: Number of examination observations, spring 1998 – spring 2003 
 Number of 
examinations 
Number of 
 students 
Number of 
examinations per student 
All students    
    Electives 4 621 2 041 2.26 
    Second block 25 494 2 313 11.02 
    Third block 8 119 1 426 5.69 
    Total 38 234 2 313 16.53 
Four-year students    
    Electives 3 894 1 620 2.40 
    Second block 19 380 1 784 10.86 
    Third block 5 761 1 055 5.46 
    Total 29 035 1 784 16.28 
College students    
    Electives 727 421 1.73 
    Second block 6 114 529 11.56 
    Third block 2 358 371 6.36 
    Total 9 199 529 17.39 
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Table 2: Information on colleges with applicants to the second study block at NHH 1998-2002 
 
College  
Total  
admission  
1998-2002 
Min.  
yearly  
admission 
Max.  
yearly  
admission
Rejected 
applicants
1999-2002
Min.  
yearly  
rejection
Max.  
yearly 
rejection 
 
Min.  
admission  
limit 
Max.  
admission 
limit 
Min. 
study
places
Max. 
study 
places 
A  71 10 17 37 3 13 42.4 46.2 260 280
B  54 0 25 53 4 23 – – – – 
C  47 8 12 52 9 20 Open 46.9 235 245
D  47 6 11 39 0 16 Open 44.2 50 50 
E  42 5 10 26 4 9 47.3 52.3 50 60 
F 32 5 8 25 3 10 Open 37.0 105 115
G  31 2 8 35 5 15 Open 41.1 90 110
H  28 3 9 35 6 11 45.0 48.0 125 125
I  28 3 8 17 1 10 Open 45.4 60 75 
J  23 2 8 32 6 10 39.6 45.2 60 60 
K  23 1 7 26 4 11 Open 41.1 110 115
L  16 2 5 21 4 7 Open  41.1 90 165
M  13 1 4 12 0 6 Open  38.0 55 65 
N  13 0 6 35 5 12 41.4 47.1 130 130
O  11 0 5 5 0 3 33.3 42.8 35 35 
P  9 0 4 3 0 2 Open  Open  60 90 
Q   9 0 6 7 1 3 Open  Open  80 130
R   8 1 2 8 0 5 Open  Open  65 80 
S  6 0 3 19 0 13 – – – – 
T  6 0 3 0 0 0 – – – – 
U  5 0 2 15 1 9 Open  Open  100 100
V  5 0 2 3 0 1 Open  Open  20 55 
W  2 0 1 7 0 5 Open  41.6 120 150
All  529 96 117 512 114 146 Open  52.3 20 280
 
The admission limit is points for admission from upper secondary school to the two-year economic and 
administrative study programme at the respective colleges from 1996 to 2000 (two years prior to admission to 
the second study block at NHH). Student places are the number of student places available for admission to the 
two-year economic and administrative study programme at the respective colleges from 1996-2000 (two years 
prior to admission to the second study block at NHH). “Open” means either that the course is defined as open, or 
that all qualified applicants are admitted. Information on admission limits and number of student places is 
derived from different annual publications of the “Application hand book” published by the centralised 
application processing centre (Samordna opptak). Admission information from college B and T is not available. 
“College S” is not a single college, but includes students with grounds for admission based on study at several 
schools. Rejected applicants are only included in the selection if admission points can be calculated. Information 
on rejected applicants’ college background is not available for 1998. These observations are therefore excluded. 
Since part of the information given in this table is publicly available, the colleges are in later tables labeled 
“college 1-23” (with a different sequence) to assure anonymity. 
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Table 3: The effect of students’ admission requirements on examination grades achieved at NHH 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Constant 4.597*** (0.028) 4.597***   (0.028) 8.555***    (0.363) 6.973*** (0.474) 
College student‡ -0.128*** (0.033)       
College no. 1‡   -0.118    (0.119)        
College no. 2‡   0.209**    (0.096) 0.195*  (0.109)   
College no. 3‡   -0,456***   (0.118) -0.324*** (0.120)   
College no. 4‡   0.029    (0.124) 0.054 (0.124)   
College no. 5‡   -0.322**    (0.144) -0.154 (0.134)   
College no. 6‡   -0.033    (0.153) 0.109     (0.139)   
College no. 7‡   -0.107    (0.152) -0.145  (0.140)   
College no. 8‡   -0.059    (0.144) -0.080 (0.134)   
College no. 9‡   -0.005    (0.167) 0.252* (0.147)   
College no. 10‡   -0.482***   (0.165) -0.480***    (0.146)   
College no. 11‡   -0.345    (0.224) -0.249       (0.184)   
College no. 12‡   -0.264    (0.200) -0.365**      (0.168)   
College no. 13‡   0.103    (0.220) 0.315*        (0.179)   
College no. 14‡   -0.212    (0.247) -0.039       (0.200)   
College no. 15‡   0.34    (0.269) 0.246       (0.214)   
College no. 16‡   -0.618**    (0.262) -0.512**     (0.204)   
College no. 17‡   -0.244    (0.282) 0.121        (0.220)   
College no. 18‡   -0.779**    (0.357) -0.588**      (0.272)   
College no. 19‡   1.176**    (0.569) 0.338        (0.429)   
College no. 20‡   -0.089    (0.351) -0.087     (0.264)   
College no. 21‡   -0.111    (0.112) 0.139    (0.118) 1.582     (0.380) 
College no. 22‡   -0.338    (0.321) 0.089        (0.245) 1.529      (0.439) 
College no. 23‡   -0.564*    (0.323) 0.099   (0.250) 1.523      (0.441) 
Admission points     -1.857*** (0.144) -1.812***   (0.142) 
Age     -0.150*** (0.014) -0.142***   (0.014) 
Open study‡       1.220*** (0.375) 
School points/10       0.293***    (0.085) 
Student places/100       0.109***    (0.034) 
no. of observations 38 234 38 234 9 199 9 199  
R2 0.069 0.075 0.187 0.172  
 
The dependent variable is examination grade. Regressions are estimated by random effects GLS. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. Dummies for 22 different subjects are included in all regressions but not reported. BEA200 (financial accounting 
and financing) is the excluded category. In the last column, the dummies for colleges 21-23 are kept since we do not have data 
for admission requirements and number of student places for these colleges. 
‡ indicates dummy variables 
* means significant at 10% level          ** means significant at 5% level          *** means significant at 1% level 
 
